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This project focuses on the ultimatum game—an experiment done by many economists to
determine levels of altruism, fairness, equality, and financial responsibility individuals possess. It
involves two players bargaining over a sum of money and is often used as a proxy for how
people manage their income, negotiate for salaries, or think about fairness. Many identities have
been tested, such as age, race, and gender, and while differences have been found based on
gender, nobody has controlled the study for sexuality. The goal of this study was to determine
whether sexuality has an impact on the results of the ultimatum game specifically by comparing
gay and straight men. A total of 18 gay men and 30 straight men participated in this game. I
analyzed the means of each group’s data points using t-tests and ran two regressions with
variables collected in the demographic survey; ultimately, there was little difference in offers
made or minimum acceptance thresholds based on sexuality. Therefore, it is impossible to reject
the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the way in which straight and gay
males play the ultimatum game. The results suggest that gay and straight men do not act
differently when given the prompts of this game, thus they may make similar financial decisions
and bargaining choices.

DeMassi 2

Table of Contents
Background ..........................................................................................................................3
Literature Review.................................................................................................................6
Methodology ......................................................................................................................10
Results ................................................................................................................................14
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................17
Tables .................................................................................................................................22
Appendix A: Recruitment ..................................................................................................25
Appendix B: Participant Materials.....................................................................................27
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................31

DeMassi 3

Background
Sexual orientation has an impact on the way in which individuals experience the world around
them, participate in an economic system, and interact with others in the marketplace. Many
people have studied the way in which gender effects economic assumptions and decisions
(Hoddinott, Kenney, Solnick, etc), though very few have considered the sexual orientation of the
individuals in the study. While understanding gender certainly provides a valuable window into
how identities can influence actions, studying gender alone could lead to generalizations about
roles and behaviors that do not control for the differing sexual orientations or family structures of
individuals.
The motivation for this project ultimately stems from the simple question: Are gay men
more, less, or similarly altruistic when compared to their straight peers, and under what
circumstances? Do gay men have any particular experiences that may make them more likely to
empathize with other people in general or with other gay men? There may exist a so-called
“solidarity complex” among people who have similar life experiences, thus causing them to feel
more altruistic towards others in the same position. For example, this could involve employers
offering higher salaries to people who they feel are struggling to make ends meet for a similar
reason to them. So perhaps gay males who are bargaining with other potential gay males might
act differently than their straight peers.
There are many ways to study this, though one practical way for an undergraduate project
was through a proxy study using an economic experiment known as the ultimatum game. In the
ultimatum game, Player A is given a set amount of money and told to divide it between Players
A and B however he or she sees fit. Player B can either accept the offer Player A has made, or
reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both players receive the allocations of money that Player
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A decided on; in the case of a rejection, both players get nothing. All players know all the rules
and possible outcomes before the game begins, so there is no inconsistency in information, and
no surprises. People who believe that actors always make rational decisions would expect Player
B to accept any offer, because getting something from the game is better than getting nothing—
however this does not always play out in practice.
Many studies on the ultimatum game actually find that people are often more generous
than researchers expect, and make offers above what they indicate as their own minimum
willingness to accept. Stanton and Ahmadi discuss this from a neurological standpoint in which
they discuss some of the implications of altruism and its impact on generosity specifically in the
ultimatum game. They conclude that for individuals who are forced to consider the reactions of
their partners, generosity increases, and predictions about self-interested actors break down.
According to prior research on this game, there is little difference in offers made by men
versus women (Solnick). However, men tend to receive higher offers than women, and people of
both genders tend to expect higher offers from women (Solnick). Studying gay men would help
answer important questions, such as:


On the offering end, would gay men make higher offers than straight men, perhaps because
they are more acutely aware of economic discrimination? Or would they be less willing to
forfeit a chance to earn money?



On the receiving end, would they recognize an opportunity to receive a financial award, no
matter how small, and be willing to accept lower offers than straight men? Or would they
expect more altruism and fairness from Player 1 and only accept more equitable offers?
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Are gay men more altruistic, trusting, and proficient with income distribution than their
heterosexual peers?



Do gay men conform to the image of the “Economic Man” more, less, or the same as
straight men?



What could be the causes of these differences in perspective?
This study would help us learn whether there are noticeable differences in the way in

which gay men participate in the economy and whether they are representative of the “rational
economic man” that is so widely accepted as the backbone for economic models. From these
potential differences or similarities it could be possible to make inferences about how gay men
view certain choices and outcomes in the economy.
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Literature Review
There is substantial economic research to suggest that men and women allocate their incomes
differently. This is critical to understand when doing research in this field; if we know that men
and women tend to have different expenditure patterns, then it is reasonable to assume that they
will act differently in the marketplace and therefore may act differently in the ultimatum game.
In particular, several studies show that when women control a greater share of the household
income, children benefit in a variety of ways.
Phipps and Burton studied the influence of male and female incomes on expenditure
patterns using data from Canada. Men and women seem to have different responsibilities for
spending their income, which reinforces the importance that gender roles play in society. Women
were more likely to be the ones “responsible” for purchasing goods for children, for example.
The study also found that men and women tend to spend their own income on private goods that
are for themselves, meaning each person in the relationship is likely to purchase small-ticket
items using their own income. This again reinforces the idea that men and women often control
their own incomes separately (except for big-ticket items like mortgages, where couples often
“pool” their incomes). The study is careful to survey only families with full-time, full-year
working parents.
Looking at food insecurity as a specific impact of income allocation, Kenny finds that
when women control most of the income, young children are less likely to experience food
insecurity, while in families where the father controls a chunk of the income, food insecurity for
children rises. The article reinforces the pull of the American nuclear family norms which dictate
that women are responsible for feeding children. These findings are also consistent with evidence
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from Côte d’Ivoire (Hoddinott and Haddad) which suggests that there is a correlation between
the identity of a wage earner and his or her consumption patterns. Interestingly enough, this
study looks at both heterosexual couples and also single parent households. The evidence here
suggests that raising a woman’s income increases the share of food budget and decreases the
share of budget designated for tobacco and alcohol.
Many of these studies are done in developing nations, and several more from Africa help
solidify the point. Blumberg shows using data from various countries in Africa that women are
more likely to be altruistic with their income rather than selfish, spending income on “basic
human needs” for the family. Losses in women’s income can be devastating for food production
and consumption, for example. There are further implications of this study: women who have
more economic control have more decision making control in the household. If men are typically
the more selfish of the sexes, then it would be interesting to learn whether gay men follow in the
same steps as their straight peers. Determining whether gay men are more, equally, or less selfish
than typical males will have implications for household income expenditures.
More evidence of gender roles and bargaining arises in households with more than two
adults. Gummerson and Schneider look at bargaining patterns over how to spend and distribute
income, finding that bargaining for resource allocation tends to happen in groups that are based
on gender, meaning women often have the same ideas as other women about how to spend
money, while men have ideas that are different from women but similar to other men.
Additionally, as more adults were added to the household, women’s bargaining power over the
family’s money is lowered. The fact that bargaining tends to happen in gendered groups could
provide some insight into how same-sex couples choose to allocate their incomes, since samesex couples are by definition the same gender.
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Sara Solnick has done significant work regarding the ultimatum game, and how gender,
physical appearance, and other things affect how the game is played. In one study (2001), she
showed that men tend to attract higher monetary offers in the game, particularly from women.
Additionally, people of both genders expected higher offers from women making offers rather
than men. Further study in 2008 using gender controls in the Investment Game showed that
women are more trustworthy than men—which could possibly be related to the fact that women
are more likely to be responsible with their incomes. However, men tended to trust more than
women did, perhaps because they expected a higher return on their investment—this is related to
the previous study suggesting that men attract higher offers in the ultimatum game. Another
ultimatum game study by Solnick and Schweitzer suggests that there is a premium for being
attractive or being a male: Both men and attractive people were offered more. However, more
was demanded of attractive people while less was demanded of men. These results may have
bargaining implications, for salary negotiations and setting household budgets.
There are also evolutionary explanations for why men and women play these types of
games differently. Saad and Gill find differences in offers men and women make (unlike
Solnick’s study which shows only major differences in Player B’s behavior). Men tended to
make higher offers to women than to men, which they suggest may be because men are
accustomed to having to compete with other men for mates—so they offer more to women while
being more competitive with their male peers. Gay men are arguably less occupied with
impressing females, and my study will have Player B be anonymous, so it would be interesting to
see whether this affects how they make offers to Player B. Additionally, Eckel and Grossman
find that in a double anonymous dictator game (similar to the ultimatum game), women offered
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twice as much on average as men did, suggesting their commitment to altruism and selflessness.
My study is intended to show the extent to which gay men exhibit a commitment to altruism.
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Methodology
The majority of research for this study was centered on performing the ultimatum game with
groups of individuals recruited for the study. Individuals were recruited by advertisement in the
community and on campus, using pull-tab fliers in the student center and academic buildings,
outreach in classes with large numbers of students, and several emails to appropriate mailing
lists. Recruitment was also done by word of mouth and referrals from participants. Special
attention was given to using resources to locate self-identifying gay men for the study. I used the
UVM LGBTQA Center and the VT Pride Center for their resources, mostly for their email
contacts and for reaching out to groups that meet in these locations.
When the participants were recruited for the project, they were told that the researchers
were seeking “self-identifying gay or straight males who were at least 18 years old.” The fliers
indicated that the game was a study on decision making, and if asked for further clarification,
participants were told that the researcher was looking to study how different people make
decisions and what kinds of responses they would have to some prompts. These prompts
involved playing a short game, on paper, in which players would be paired with another
participant that they would not have the chance to meet. The recruitment flier and a sample email
that was sent out to email lists can be seen in Appendix A: Recruitment.
Participation in the game was confidential, the privacy of the participants was protected,
and compliance with all Institutional Review Board (IRB) regulations was addressed.
Participants were paid for their involvement in the study, so as to give the players a real stake in
the game. Each participant was given a $5 Ben & Jerry’s ice cream gift card just for showing up,
and then participants were paid based on their outcomes in one of their two games. A random
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number generator in Google spreadsheets was used to determine which of the two games they
would be paid for; this involved using a formula to assign each of the two games a random
number between 0 and 1, allowing the researchers to randomize which room was the Player “A”
room and which was the Player “B” room. In total, seven sessions were held in February and
March of 2017.
When participants arrived at the research site, a greeter checked them in and gave them a
slip of paper with a code that they would use for identification on relevant forms, such as the
game sheets and the demographic surveys. The greeter arbitrarily divided participants among
two separate rooms, one proctored by the researcher and one by his adviser, in an attempt to keep
approximately equal numbers of participants in each room. (In the event of an odd number, one
player in the smaller room was assigned two partners; this player did not know he was paired
with two participants, but out of courtesy, he was paid based on whichever pairing earned the
highest returns.) The purpose of the two rooms was so that players could be paired with someone
in another room without knowing who that person was.
Once it was determined that all participants consented to the study, the researchers read
instructions, gave examples, and checked players’ understanding with a short “quiz” containing
possible allocations of money. These instructions and the quiz can be seen in Appendix B:
Participant Materials. There were multiple opportunities to ask questions during instruction.
In order to play the game, Player A was given $10 and told to divide it between Players A
and B however he saw fit, but using only whole numbers. Player B could either accept the offer
Player A had made, or reject the offer. If the offer was accepted, both players received the
allocations of money that Player A had decided on; in the case of a rejection, both players got
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nothing. All players knew all the rules and possible outcomes before the game begins, so there
was no inconsistency in information, and no surprises. Each pair effectively played two games,
because each participant had a chance to be Player A and Player B.
To play as Player A, participants used a pre-printed game sheet to select an allocation
from a list of all the possible allocations; this produced the data point referred to as the “offer.”
An example would be offering $4 to your opponent and keeping $6 for yourself. To play as
Player B, participants recorded on that same game sheet a decision for whether or not they would
accept each of the possible offers that Player A could have made. This generally1 produced a
data point called the “minimum acceptance threshold” (referred to in this paper as the
“minimum”, for short); this was the minimum offer that Player B would be willing to accept out
of all the possible offers. An example of this might be indicating that you would accept any offer
of $3 or higher but reject any offer of $2 or lower, thus the “minimum” would be $3.
After being given these instructions on how to play the game, participants recorded both
their offers (for when they were Player A) and the minimum amount they would accept (for
when they were Player B). Participants filled out the sheet for both players at the same time. The
sheet that participants used can be seen in Appendix B.
In order to calculate results, the researchers used a Google spreadsheet, which allowed
for simultaneous editing and data transfer without leaving the separate rooms. Meanwhile, the
participants answered a questionnaire, which contained a space to identify gender and sexuality,
as well as other demographic factors (the exact survey can be found in Appendix B). The
outcome of each participant’s game was shared individually using the code sheets. After this,
1

Two players also had a “maximum acceptance threshold,” meaning they indicated they would also reject certain
offers that they deemed to be too high. Neither of the players were offered a high enough amount for this maximum
to make a difference in their payouts.
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participants were free to leave the study and receive payment from the greeter they met on the
way in. The sessions averaged approximately 30 minutes in duration and the average payout
from the game was $5 in cash, plus a $5 gift card for showing up.
To analyze the results, I used Microsoft Excel to calculate basic demographics from the
study (number of participants and their responses to the demographic survey), as well as the
averages and standard deviations for each category of people. I used Gretl regression software to
run t-tests and regressions for the data. I used the t-tests to determine whether or not there was a
significant difference between the data points for gay and straight men, and a regression to
determine whether the independent variable of sexuality had an influence on the dependent
variables of the offer and the minimum.
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Results
The first thing to note about this study is that the participants were relatively homogeneous,
owing largely to the population sample that was available in the area. A total of 49 individuals
participated in the study over the course of the sessions, however not every participant could be
counted in the results. One individual indicated on the demographic survey a gender other than
male and by coincidence also happened to not follow instructions properly on the game sheet;
this data point was eliminated. Additionally, there were 4 participants who did not identify as
either gay or straight; however the decision was made to group these participants with those who
identified as gay, given that the purpose of the study broadly was to compare straight males to
non-straight males. The tables for these results can all be found in the Tables section.
This brought the number of valid entries to 48, which can be seen in Table 1. Of these
48, 18 identified as gay and 30 identified as straight. In terms of other demographics, 96% of the
participants had completed at least some college, and 92% identified white as their race; 56%
were between the ages of 18-21. Additionally, 81% of the participants identified as either
somewhat liberal or liberal on a question regarding general political leanings.
In the game, each player had the opportunity to play as two players, A and B. Player A
was the one who made the offer and Player B was the one who chose whether or not to accept
that offer. Thus there were two critical data points for each participant: when playing as Player
A, the important figure was the amount they offered to Player B (“Offer”), and when playing as
B, the important figure was the minimum offer they would be willing to accept from Player A
(“Minimum”). The mean and standard deviation for each data point for each group of
participants is shown in Table 2. Two participants in the game offered more than $5 to their

DeMassi 15

opponent, and both were straight, white males; nobody had a minimum acceptance of more than
$5.
There was very little difference in both offers and minimums based on sexuality. Straight
males offered a mean of $4.72 while gay males offered a mean of $4.56, suggesting that straight
males were slightly more generous on average. For minimums, straight males accepted a mean
minimum of $3.00 while gay males accepted a mean minimum of $2.83, suggesting that either
straight males demanded a comparably higher offer, or that gay males were willing to accept a
comparatively lower offer, depending on your interpretation. The only interesting statistic from
the standard deviations is that gay males’ offers were the most concentrated of nearly any group
in the study—the standard deviation was 1.042.
In Tables 3 and 4, you can see the results of the t-tests for both offers and minimums
based on the control of sexuality. This test was to determine whether there was a significant
difference between the means of the data for straight and gay men. For both cases, the following
hypotheses were used:
H0: Difference of means = 0
H1: Difference of means ≠ 0.
So in order to reject the null hypothesis of no difference, there would have to be a statistically
significant difference between the mean offers (or minimums) of gay and straight men. For both
cases, at the 95% confidence interval, the test statistic was not high enough to reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in the offers and minimums for gay males and straight males.
On balance, the highest offers came from younger people, with participants aged 18-21
offering a mean of $4.81. The next highest means were whites ($4.77) and liberals ($4.74).
Conversely, the lowest offers came from non-whites ($3.50), moderates and conservatives
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($4.33), and those aged 21 and up ($4.48). As for the minimums, younger people and those with
more than a college degree were willing to accept the lowest offers ($2.74 and $2.75
respectively), while those with less than a college degree and non-whites demanded the highest
offers ($4.50 and $3.25 respectively).
In order to determine whether the independent variable of sexuality had an impact on the
dependent variables of the offer and minimum, I ran a regression using the ordinary least squares
model. For the variables, I continued to divide age into groups of ≤21 and >21, and continued to
use the liberal and conservative/moderate binary. The results can be seen in Table 5. Neither of
these regressions show any significant findings, meaning that none of the variables had a
statistically significant impact on the offer or minimum. Therefore, given the data from this
study, it is impossible to reject the original hypothesis that there is no difference between how
straight men and gay men play in the ultimatum game.
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Conclusions
Same-sex households are a growing dynamic entering American culture, deviating from
generations of norms and standards for how a typical family should operate. For some, it is
challenging to understand how the two male or two female parent dynamic plays out at home,
and with only very limited data and studies (same-sex marriages and unions have only been well
documented for two decades at best) this is at the forefront of economic, sociological, and gender
studies research. Research suggesting that men aren’t as proficient at performing child-rearing
tasks as women has long been a cloud looming over the LGBTQ community.
This particular study showed no significant difference between the offers and minimums
of gay and straight men in the ultimatum game. So since gay men and straight men show no
difference in how they respond to prompts in the ultimatum game, it is possible that gay men
view finances, money, and fairness similarly to straight men, and that their levels of altruism are
not noticeably higher than straight men. This study is unable to say that gay men would make
different decisions than that their straight peers, or that they think about the economic world
differently, since we see no difference in the results of the game. Certainly this game is not the
only way to judge how individuals will manage their financial lives—but it provides valuable
insight.
If it were possible to redo this study over again, there are some aspects I would change to
make it more effective and make it run more smoothly. First of all, as I have mentioned, the
sample size for this study was small and homogeneous; with more time and funding, it would
have been possible to expand recruitment efforts in a few ways. First of all, I would have reached
beyond the immediate area surrounding UVM’s campus for participants. There was a lack of
participants who were outside the typical college age and demographics. Visiting community
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sites in Burlington and surrounding towns would allow for older participants and a greater
variety of racial backgrounds. (Race in particular was challenging because the area is
predominantly white.)
Additionally, despite all best efforts to make very simple and easy to understand
instructions and materials, the instructors still encountered questions from participants about how
the game works and received game sheets that were either incomplete or filled out incorrectly. I
was able to have one practice session prior to holding the first real session, but there were only
four people present. It would have been useful to hold additional practice sessions to get
comfortable with the kinds of questions people ask and make sure the real sessions ran smoothly.
On a more technical note, there is a question in the demographic survey (which can be
seen in Appendix B) that at least one participant found to be limiting, and I as a researcher found
to be ineffective also. When asking participants about political leanings, the scale I used required
participants to indicate beliefs on a strictly liberal—conservative scale. It would have been
interesting to ask two separate questions in place of the single question: One that asks
participants to consider “economic issues” and one that asks participants to consider “social
issues.” I feel that the responses to the single question do not allow for enough nuances in
people’s beliefs; one participant who felt strongly about this sentiment even wrote at the bottom
of the page: “That [circle] is so you have a data point, but liberal vs. conservative doesn’t capture
the political spectrum well. I am very liberal on social issues and moderately conservative on
fiscal issues.”
It is my hope that in the future, students and academics alike will consider further
research in this important and developing intersection of disciplines. A study such as this one
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could be replicated on a much larger and more demographically diverse sample if given more
time and funding. Additional findings across multiple studies would be useful because they
would either confirm or challenge the results I have found here. Additionally there are numerous
ways in which this research could be expanded to capture new circumstances.
Including women in the study eventually would be important, given that my initial
interest in this area of study came about due to noticeable gender differences both in how the
game is played and in how men and women view altruism. I initially wanted to study four groups
of participants: gay males, straight males, gay women, and straight women. But due to funding
constraints, it was determined that using just two categories would allow for a larger n-size in
each category.
Similar work should also be done in different geographic areas. Since a large number of
the participants were college students, there may have been some geographic diversity built into
the study—I chose not to ask the home state or region of participants. But it is entirely possible
that gay and straight men in different regions of the country may think about the game
differently. There are more liberal and more conservative areas of the country, variations in the
perception of gay males as a group, and certainly a wide range of socioeconomic statuses
impacting different parts of the country. Each of these could impact the decisions that people
make in their offers and willingness to accept.
Researchers know that the amount of money at stake has an effect on how the ultimatum
game is played—the most significant finding is that as the amount to bargain over increases,
rejection rates tend to decrease, though it isn’t as clear how the offers change. While $10 is
enough money to provide a reasonable stake in the game for participants (and is affordable for
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the researchers), a game in which $100 was at stake would provide even more information about
altruism. Specifically: If Player A estimates that his or her partner is likely to accept the offer,
how generous will they be willing to be?
There are also opportunities to play games that are face-to-face rather than anonymous. I
chose to design my game with anonymous partners because it would be easier to get participants
to consent to games in which they would not have to interact with another person, and I felt it
would be difficult to control for the various effects of being able to see your partner. However, it
would be interesting to play games in which players reveal their sexual orientation to their
partners (or where each player is told the sexual orientation of his or her partner). This could test
assumptions of how people expect others to play.
Finally, there is another game similar to the ultimatum game that should be considered:
the dictator game. Player A’s role is virtually identical, but Player B’s role is almost nonexistent;
in the dictator game, Player B doesn’t have the chance to choose whether to accept or reject the
offer. The offer automatically stands as Player A decided. This game is a pure test of altruism,
but does not allow for the bargaining and two-step nature that is seen in the ultimatum game.
It would also be interesting to ask subjective questions such as why the participants chose
and accepted the particular allocations they did. In speaking with some participants post data
collection, I heard many comments from people wondering why everyone didn’t just offer an
equal payment to their partner. These kinds of remarks signal an expectation of equality and
fairness among my sample that traditional economics does not often account for. As mentioned
earlier, the rational choice for Player A would be to offer only a small amount, and the rational
choice for B would be to accept any offer (because presumably something is better than nothing).
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As more and more families fall outside the traditional American family and different
sexual orientations become accepted in the mainstream, it will be important to examine the
impact this will have on the economy, in everything from investment into children, to bargaining
for wages, to ideas about fairness and equality. This study is not a conclusion, but merely opens
the door for a new field of research and inquiry.

DeMassi 22

Tables
Table 1
Category
Sexuality

Identity
Straight
Not straight

Race

White
Non-white
18-21
>21

Age
Education

Political
Total

Less than college
Some college
More than some college
Liberal
Moderate or conservative
All

Number
30
18
44
4
27
21
2
38
8
39
9
48

Percentage
63%
38%
92%
8%
56%
44%
4%
79%
17%
81%
19%
100%

Table 2
Category

Identity

Sexuality

Straight
Not straight
White
Non-white

Race
Age

Offer:
Offer:
Minimum: Minimum:
Mean
Std Dev Mean
Std Dev
$4.72
1.552
$3.00
1.722
$4.56
1.042
$2.83
1.689
$4.77
1.292
$2.91
1.668
$3.50
1.915
$3.25
2.217

18-21
>21
Education Less than college
Some college
More than some college

$4.81
$4.48
$4.50
$4.71
$4.50

1.241
1.537
0.500
1.137
2.236

$2.74
$3.19
$4.50
$2.89
$2.75

1.767
1.601
0.500
1.689
1.714

Political

$4.74
$4.33

1.428
1.118

$2.92
$3.00

1.707
1.732

$4.67

1.359

$2.94

1.676

Total

Liberal
Moderate or
conservative
All
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Table 3
Sexuality: Offer
Null hypothesis: Difference of means = 0
Sample 1: Straight
n = 30, mean = 4.73333, s.d. = 1.55216
standard error of mean = 0.283384
95% confidence interval for mean: 4.15375 to 5.31292

Sample 2: Gay
n = 18, mean = 4.55556, s.d. = 1.04162
standard error of mean = 0.245512
95% confidence interval for mean: 4.03757 to 5.07354

Test statistic: t(46) = (4.73333 - 4.55556)/0.413097 = 0.430353
Two-tailed p-value = 0.6689
(one-tailed = 0.3345)

Table 4
Sexuality: Minimum
Null hypothesis: Difference of means = 0
Sample 1: Straight
n = 30, mean = 3, s.d. = 1.72207
standard error of mean = 0.314405
95% confidence interval for mean: 2.35697 to 3.64303

Sample 2: Gay
n = 18, mean = 2.83333, s.d. = 1.68907
standard error of mean = 0.398116
95% confidence interval for mean: 1.99338 to 3.67329

Test statistic: t(46) = (3 - 2.83333)/0.509807 = 0.326921
Two-tailed p-value = 0.7452
(one-tailed = 0.3726)
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Table 5

Variable
Constant
Sexuality
Race
Age
Politics

Ordinary Least Squares, using observations 1—48
Model 1: Offer
Coefficient Standard Error
t-ratio

0: Straight
1: Gay
0: White
1: Non-white
0: ≤21
1: >21
0: Liberal
1: Moderate/
Conservative

Variable
Constant
Sexuality
Race
Age
Politics

0: Straight
1: Gay
0: White
1: Non-white
0: ≤21
1: >21
0: Liberal
1: Moderate/
Conservative

p-value Significance

4.93502

0.357526

13.8032

<0.0001 ***

−0.0762684

0.337017

−0.2263

0.8220

−1.17739

0.846246

−1.3913

0.1713

−0.183872

0.399837

−0.4599

0.6479

−0.326339

0.399492

−0.8169

0.4185

Model 2: Minimum
Coefficient Standard Error

t-ratio

p-value Significance

2.79502

0.416157

6.7162

<0.0001 ***

−0.188268

0.529762

−0.3554

0.7240

0.218607

1.06933

0.2044

0.8390

0.424128

0.50462

0.8405

0.4053

0.0496613

0.678227

0.0732

0.9420
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Appendix A: Recruitment

Volunteers needed for decision making study!
Are you a straight male or gay male interested in
supporting student research at UVM?

I am seeking self-identifying straight or gay men for a study on decision making.
Participants will:
 Play a game and answer a short demographic survey
 Receive a Ben & Jerry’s gift card and possible cash rewards
 Be finished in less than one hour
Please contact Nick DeMassi to sign up or to ask further questions!

Nick DeMassi, Economics Student at the University of Vermont
Phone: 774-254-1045  Email: ndemassi@uvm.edu
Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu

Nick DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu
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Sample Email
Subject Line: Seeking participants for a research project on decision making
Hello everyone!
My name is Nicholas DeMassi, I am an economics student at the University of Vermont and I
am seeking participants for my thesis research. In particular, I am looking to recruit selfidentifying straight and gay men for a decision making study that involves playing a game and
taking a short demographic survey.
Participation will involve compensation for your time. Playing the game does not involve
interaction with other participants; however you will be in the same room as other participants.
Your name and sexual orientation will not be known to other participants and will only be used
by the researchers.
If you are interested in being a participant in this study or if you have further questions, please
contact me at 774-254-1045 (phone call or text) or ndemassi@uvm.edu. Thank you very much
for your time!
Nicholas DeMassi
774-254-1045
ndemassi@uvm.edu
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Appendix B: Participant Materials
First, let’s learn how to play the game

1. There are two players: Player A and Player B.
2. Player A is given a sum of money and told to divide the money between
Player A and Player B, using only whole numbers.
3. Player B then has the option to either accept the offer or reject it.
 If Player B accepts the offer, Player A and Player B each receive the
payouts that Player A offered.
 If Player B rejects the offer, both players receive nothing.
Here are a couple of examples
 Suppose Player A is given $6:
o Player A offers $4 to himself, and $2 to Player B.
o Player B accepts the offer, so he gets $2 and Player A gets $4.
 Suppose Player A is given $9:
o Player A offers $5 to herself and $4 to Player B.
o Player B rejects the offer, so both players get $0.
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Let’s check your understanding of how the game works with a couple of questions

1. Suppose Player A is given $7. Which of the following divisions would it be
possible for Player A to make? (Circle all that apply):
a. $6 for Player A and $2 for Player B
b. $7 for Player A and $0 for Player B
c. $3 for Player A and $4 for Player B
d. $3 for Player A and $2 for Player B
2. If Player A chooses to offer Player B $3, and keep $4 for herself, what are
the options for Player B? (Circle all that apply):
a. Accept the offer and receive $3
b. Accept the offer and receive $0
c. Reject the offer and receive $3
d. Reject the offer and receive $0

When you play the game, you will first play as Player A and then you will play as
Player B.
When you play as Player B, rather than viewing the offer from Player A, you will
instead make a decision for every possible offer—the researchers will match your
decisions with the actual offer that is made by your partner in the other room.
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It’s Time to Play the Game!
Decision: Player A

Player A

Select how you wish to divide $10
between you and Player B.
Circle the allocation you choose.

Allocation
Money for
Money for
B (Partner)
A (You)
$10
$0
$9
$1
$8
$2
$7
$3
$6
$4
$5
$5
$4
$6
$3
$7
$2
$8
$1
$9
$0
$10

Decision: Player B
Player B

Please indicate which
offers you would be
willing to accept by
circling either Accept
or Reject next to each
offer.

Allocation
Money for
Money for
A (Partner)
B (You)
$10
$0
$9
$1
$8
$2
$7
$3
$6
$4
$5
$5
$4
$6
$3
$7
$2
$8
$1
$9
$0
$10

Your Decision

Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept
Accept

Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
Reject
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Demographic Survey
Please answer the following questions by circling the letter of the best response. If you would
prefer not to answer any particular question, please leave it blank.
1) What is your age?
A) 18-24
B) 25-34
C) 35-44
D) 45-54
E) 55+
2) What is your ethnicity?
A) White
B) Hispanic or Latino
C) Black or African American
D) Asian or Pacific Islander
E) Native American or American Indian or Alaska Native
F) Bi- or Multi-racial
G) Other _________________
3) What is your gender?
A) Male
B) Female
C) Transgender Male
D) Transgender Female
E) Other __________________
4) How do you identify sexually?
A) Straight
B) Bisexual
C) Gay
D) Queer
E) Unsure/Questioning
F) Other ___________________
5) What is the highest level of education you have attained?
A) High School
B) Trade/technical/vocational training
C) Some college (currently enrolled, not yet complete)
D) Bachelor’s Degree
E) Graduate Degree
6) How would you describe yourself politically?
A) Liberal
B) Somewhat liberal
C) Moderate
D) Somewhat conservative
E) Conservative
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